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Abstract 
 
Spatio-Temporal Auditing (STA) entails a critical examination of performance of economic policies and 
development programmes within a defined context, space and time. This paper employs the STA to critique 
Nigeria’s industrial policies (IPs) and entrepreneurship development interventions (EDIs) from 1946 to 2013 with 
a view to answering the salient question: Has Nigeria’s industrial policies and entrepreneurship interventions 
impacted on technological progress (TP), wealth creation (WC) and employment generation (EG) in the 
economy? The authors sourced the required qualitative data from Nigeria’s industrial policy documents, 
development working papers, journal articles and relevant online resources on the subject. The data were 
subjected to content analysis (CA) and thematic analysis (TA) from which objective conclusions were made. The 
key conclusion from the paper is that Nigeria’s development policies targeted at industrial and entrepreneurship 
development have not produced the desirable and measurable performance results; rather they put Nigeria into 
huge economic deficits. The paper supports the argument for the adoption of a Sustainable Development Triangle 
(SWT) with a collaborative synergy from Government agencies, Corporations and Small Entrepreneurs in the 
nation’s developmental process. The proposed SDT, unlike previous development policies is sustainable and 
unlikely to generate a dependency culture, a critical factor for policy failure in Nigeria. 
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1.0. Introduction 
 
Nigeria gained independence on October 1, 1960 with pomp and pageantry, driven by high hope and tall vision 
from the nationalists and economic planners. The aspiration of the citizens was that the country would swiftly 
become an industrial giant and a worthy economic reference point for other third-world nations (TWNs) in sub-
Saharan Africa. Pursuant of the tall dream of economic progress and industrialisation, the early policymakers 
were guided by the growth theories of the late 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s of Harrod, Domar, Lewis and 
Rostow respectively, which justified the need for the less developing countries (LDCs) to embrace development 
planning as a sustainable process of changing the structure of their economies with a view to reducing incidence 
of poverty, illiteracy, chronic diseases, governance gap, unemployment, infrastructural deficit and endemic 
income inequality (Sanusi, 2010; Raimi and Ogunjirin, 2012).  
 
In line with the expectations above, Nigeria since attainment of statehood had experimented with different 
development plans (DPs) for the purpose of promoting agricultural, industrial and overall economic development 
in the country. However, these numerous DPs with their associated industrialisation policies (IPs) and 
entrepreneurship development interventions (EDIs) have consistently failed to stimulate employment generation, 
poverty reduction and accelerated economic growth and development (Raimi, Mobolaji and Bello, 2010).  
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It is worrisome that Nigeria once rated as one of the 50 affluent countries in the early 1970s suddenly nose-dived 
on the development ladder to become one of the 25 poorest countries in early 2000s (Igbuzor, 2006).  
 
The woeful performance of development polices in Nigeria was reinforced by a former President, Olusegun 
Obasanjo that Nigeria “...must not continue to stress the pursuit of a high growth rate in statistical terms and fail 
to reduce the social and economic deprivation of a substantial number and group of our people. We must not 
absolutely pursue wealth and growth at the expense of inner wellbeing, joy, satisfaction, fulfilment, and 
contentment of human being” (IMF, 2004:29).   
 
On the strength of the assertion above, it is not enough to formulate a development policy and programme, but the 
implementation process must address three dimensions of sustainability – Economic, Social and Environmental 
often called Sustainable Triangle (ST) or Sustainable Development Triangle (SDT) in the development literature 
(Daly, 1973; Munasinghe, 1994; Munasinghe, 2012). The taxonomy of SDT has been described as reflecting a 
balance of environmental, social and economic issues surrounding development (Gjoksi and Sedlacko, 2010). The 
economic dimension looks at the impact development on the growth in a nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
often view as measurement of wellbeing and economic performance; the social dimension of development focuses 
on equity and well-being of the society; while the environmental dimension relates to absence of threats to the 
ecosystem or natural environment in the development process (Munasinghe, 2012).  
 
Flowing from the discussion above, the objective of this paper is two-fold. The first is to critique Nigeria’s 
Industrial policies and entrepreneurship developing interventions from 1946 to 2013 with a view to answering the 
question: Has Nigeria’s industrial policies and entrepreneurship interventions impacted on technological progress 
(TP), wealth creation (WC) and employment generation (EG) in the economy? In furtherance of the objective, the 
Spatio-Temporal Audit (STA) is the adopted analytical tool for evaluating the performance of Nigeria’s economic 
policies and development programmes within a defined context, space and time. This type of tool is often 
employed to properly situate socio-economic issues or historical events in their right perspective, space and time. 
Carroll (1999) employed this type of analytical tool in the treatise entitled ‘Corporate Social Responsibility 
Evolution of a Definitional Construct’. Furthermore, Tounés et al., (2011) utilised the same tool in the work 
entitled ‘A Spatio-Temporal Odyssey Around the Concepts of Sustainable Development and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Boundaries to Be Determined?’ It is called audit here because the strengths and weaknesses of the 
DPs, IPs and EDIs shall be clearly outlined. 
 
In situating the research within the domain of the two objectives above, the authors discuss the paper under four 
sections. Section I, is the introductory segment of the paper, which provide background information into the 
discourse. Section II looks at development policy during the era of colonialism (1946-1960), deliverables of the 
DPs and the socio-economic outcomes. Section III discusses DPs during the era of four-year development plans 
(1962-1985) and their fallouts. Section IV casts a cursory look at DPs during the period of perspective-rolling 
plans (1990-1998). Section V focuses on DPs in the contemporary era (1999-2013). Section VI provides objective 
judgement on whether Nigeria’s DPs have impacted on TP, WC and EG when viewed against macro-economic 
variables like poverty rate, unemployment rate and external debt obligation. The section concludes with a modest 
discussion on Sustainable Development Triangle (SDT) as a desirable paradigm in the nation’s development 
process. This analytical approach had been employed by several social scientists (Salawu et al., 2006; Lawal and 
Oluwatoyin, 2011; Tounés, et al., 2011; Olowookere, 2012).  
 
2.0 IPs and EDIs: Era of colonialism (1946-1960) 
 
The first development plan in the history of Nigeria was the 1946 ten-year colonial development plan with a 
projected expenditure of N110 million. The thrust of the plan, which took effect on April 1, 1946 and lapsed on 
March 31, 1956, was to expand economic potentials of Nigeria (Salawu et al., 2006; NBS, 2012) through welfare 
measures and projects that, would stimulate economic growth potentials of the country (Ogunjimi, 1997; 
Olowookere, 2012). Despite the laudable intentions of the ten-year colonial development plan, it suffered a 
number of weaknesses with regards to entrepreneurship and promotion of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSMEs). One, there was selective implementation of the plan as emphasis was on cash crops like cocoa, palm 
products, cotton, groundnut and timber required for exports for boosting the revenue base of the colonial 
government rather than wellbeing of the indigenous small entrepreneurs (Oladejo, 2012). Two, the plan favoured 
dominant multinational corporations (MNCs) and well-established foreign entrepreneurs to the detriment of local 
businesses operating in the agricultural value chain (Salawu et al, 2006; Oladejo, 2013).  
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science                                                  Vol. 4 No. 1; January 2014 
296 
 
However, the often cited weakness was that ‘the policy of local sourcing of raw materials [which] were hardly 
pursued as a result of easy availability of cheap exchange rate to import foreign components; these situations 
hampered the development of MSMEs” (NBS, 2012:21). These weaknesses crippled MSMEs and the artistic 
creativity of local craftsmen to the satisfaction of the colonial policymakers and their MNCs. Similarly, Oladejo 
(2013:135) lamented that under the colonial development policy “the practice of local crafts dwindled as its 
production were discouraged to avoid competition with finished goods imported into Nigeria.” 
 
Five years after, a second colonial development plan (1955-1960) was formulated to improve the Nigerian 
economy, while awaiting an independent Federal Government proposed for 1960 (Olaniyi, 1998; Salawu et al., 
2006). The major weakness arising from second plan like the 1946 version was poor implementation, split of the 
development plan and structural changes forced on the colonial administration by the nationalists as a result of the 
euphoria of self-rule (Olowookere, 2012). 
 
3.0 IPs and EDIs: Era of Four-Year Plans (1962-1985) 
 
After 1960 independence, the Federal government pursed a number of IPs and EDIs in order to redress the 
unfavourable colonial legacy on economic development and welfare of the citizens. The post-independent 
government formulated four (4) national development plans (NDPs), with almost the same policy thrusts 
(Obadan, 2002; Olayiwola and Adeleye, 2005). The National Planning Commission (2011:15) re-stated that:  
 
“In retrospect, Nigeria embraced development planning as a major strategy for achieving economic development 
and social progress, particularly in the spheres of social-economic infrastructure, industrialization, high rates of 
economic growth, poverty reduction, and improvement in the living standards of the people. A number of 
development plans were drawn since independence with a view to optimally harness the abundant human and 
material resources for the benefit of all.” 
 
The major highlights of the first four NDPs after independence are sequentially discussed and critiqued. 
 
3.1. First National Development Plan (FNDP): The FNDP was implemented from 1962 to 1968 with a 
budgeted expenditure of N2.132 million (Ukah, 2007). With specific reference to micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs), the FNDP encouraged massive production of food and cash crops for local consumption 
and exports as well as employment for rural communities. The expectations were that the nation would earn 
foreign exchange from exports of crops to procure plants and machineries required for industrial development 
especially for agro-allied enterprises (Raimi et al. 2010; Olowookere, 2012).  
 
Within the FNDP, the government provided incentives scheme to MSMEs, which included strong institutional 
support for small entrepreneurs especially farmers, craftsmen, petty traders and artisans; easy access to credit 
facilities at reasonable rates; establishment of commercial banks; provision of continuous training for farmer as 
well as empowerment with research prototypes/findings; and provision of enabling environment et cetera (NBS, 
2012).  
 
In spite of the seemingly positive objectives of FNDP, they were affected by political shocks – the military coup 
and the civil war; both political turbulence slowed down the progress of the development plan and extended its 
implementation to 1970. However, the major benefits of the plan were extension of the Nigerian ports, 
commissioning of oil refinery in Port Harcourt, establishment of national paper mill and sugar manufacturing 
plant in Bacita (Kwara State), construction of Niger Dam at Jebba, completion of Niger Bridge and opening up 
several roads (Salawu et al., 2006). Regrettably, the FNDP could not accelerate industrial development nor 
nurture MSMEs because of the Adhoc nature of its implementation. Secondly, the plan was premised on the 
assumption that with rapid agricultural production and exports, the nation would become industrialised, curtail 
poverty and enhance welfare for the citizens (Obadan, 2002; Akhuemonkhan et al., 2012). 
 
3.2. Second National Development Plan (SNDP): Implementation of SNDP started under General Yakubu 
Gowon (1970-1974) with the objective of reconstructing and rehabilitating the war-affected communities in 
Nigeria after the bloody civil war (Ukah, 2007). In other words, the development plan was intended to achieve a 
united, just, strong and self-reliant nation (Olaniyi, 1988, Raimi et al., 2010; Akhuemonkhan et al., 2012). The 
plan is often described by analysts as “the vision of the 3Rs - Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation” 
(Eneh, 2011:65). To make the SNDP successful several welfare measures/incentives were provided for the 
industrial and agricultural sectors as well as small businesses (NBS, 2012). The sum of N2,050,738 billion was 
earmarked as planned expenditure (Olayiwola and Adeleye, 2005). 
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The expenditure was channelled into direct incentives, road constructions and infrastructural development with 
the intention of enhancing transportation of agricultural produce from the suburbs to the cities thereby boosting 
entrepreneurship capacities of the rural communities. The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme was 
established as interface for uniting Nigerian graduates across the three major ethnic nationalities. For human 
capital development (HCD), the plan made provision for the national scholarship and loan schemes as safety net 
for poor students to access funds for higher education (Salawu et al., 2006). The SNDP like its forerunners could 
not accelerate industrialisation and economic development because the plan’s implementation process favoured 
agricultural production as the strategy for industrial growth (Obadan, 2002; Akhuemonkhan et al., 2012).  
 
A major IP that ran concurrently with the SNDP was Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 1972, 
which was an intervention law that ensured visibility of Nigerians in the industrial landscape. NEPD gave 
Nigerian industrialists 40% of equity ownership in the major MNCs, while foreigners retained 60%. The zeal to 
empower indigenous entrepreneurs more led to the replacement of NEPD with another stringent policy christened 
Indigenization Decree of 1977. Indigenization Decree (ID) empowered Nigerian entrepreneurs with higher equity 
and reduced foreign ownership to 40 per cent, away from the 60 per cent allotted to foreigners under NEPD. The 
Decree therefore eliminated dominance of foreign MNCs in Nigeria by restructuring the ownership, control and 
management in favour of Nigerians (Okpara, Ajuka and Nwahowa, 2012). Hitherto, the major trading outlets 
were owned exclusively by foreigners (Ogunkola and Jerome, 2006). It may be argued that NEPD and ID were 
superficially beneficial to MSMEs for few strategic reasons. One, both policies increased participation of 
Nigerians in the ownership and running of foreign MNCs. Two, there was a sustainable growth in the outputs of 
agro-allied & textile industry, the petroleum/petrochemicals sub-sector, and the iron & steel sector (Oladejo, 
2013). As good as NEPD and ID appeared, they were unsustainable policies that discouraged foreign investors 
and MNCs. The resultant negative effect was “a decline in foreign investment [an ugly development which] 
slowed down the pace of economic activities in all sectors of the economy” (Udoh and Egwaikhide, 2008:15). 
 
3.3. Third National Development Plan (TNDP): The TNDP was launched effective from 1975 to 1980 
under the leadership of General Yakubu Gowon with a budgeted expenditure of N30 billion, which was increased 
later to N43.3 billion in the face of daunting challenges (Salawu et al., 2006). It was argued that TNDP had five 
nebulous and immeasurable objectives, which were: “(a) free and democratic society; (b) a  just and egalitarian 
society; (c) united, strong and self-reliant nation; (d) a great and dynamic economy; (e) land of bright and full 
opportunities for all citizens” (Lewis, 2007:60). The TNDP attempted to reduce disparities among the three 
Regions through integrated rural development; rural electrification scheme; establishment of River Basin 
Development Authorities (RBDAs); construction of dams/boreholes for rural water supply, housing and 
healthcare delivery services; and development of several feeder roads for easy movement of agricultural produce 
(Lewis, 2007; Akhuemonkhan et al., 2012; Olowookere, 2012).  
 
As part of the TNDP, Gowon’s administration introduced MSMEs-oriented programmes like Import Substitution 
Strategy (ISS), National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP) and Nigerian Agricultural 
Cooperative Bank (NACB). These efforts were initiated to enhance the capacity of agro-allied enterprises for self-
sufficiency in crops production, exports and employment generation for idle Nigerians (Akhuemonkhan et al., 
2012). The major weaknesses of the TNDP were: (a) its laudable objectives were not successfully implemented 
because of military take-over of government on July 1975, three months into the plan implementation 
(Olowookere, 2012). Besides, the ISS, NAFPP and NACB collapsed because of poor programme 
conceptualisation and execution by policymakers (Raimi et al., 2010). Thirdly, the five objectives were too 
ambitious, broad and were not linked to any specific time period, a factor that accounted for its failure apart from 
lack of commitment to its implementation by the policymakers (Lewis, 2007). Also, Eneh (2011:65) noted that 
the TNDP is a failure despite ‘37 years after the plan was launched’ because its foundational objectives were far 
from being achieved, rather Nigeria was plagued by poverty, ethnic rivalry, kpleptocracy, hostage-taking, 
religious riots, disunity, brutality, injustice, unemployment and bad governance. The foregoing he noted are  
evidences of ‘a land of failed people’. 
 
 
The regimes that took over from Gowon were Muritala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo in order of 
succession. The latter initiated an entrepreneurial/MSMEs programme called Operation Feed the Nation (OFN).  
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OFN was an agricultural scheme designed to empower the unemployed graduates from the universities, colleges 
of education and polytechnics as well as able-bodied non-graduates to embrace conventional/mechanised farming 
as reliable mechanisms for self-employment, food sufficiency and wealth creation in Nigeria (Agbi, 2011; 
Arogundade et al., 2011).  The major strength of OFN was that it created massive awareness on the importance of 
food sufficiency for meaningful development (Arogundade et al., 2011). The programme failed because 
graduates, trainees and non-graduate participants mentored under OFN scheme were not ready to take up 
agriculture as a profession; and the operators of OFN deployed inexperienced but theoretically equipped graduate 
farmers to teach farmers in the rural communities the rudiments of modern agriculture (Raimi et al., 2010). The 
scheme like similar programmes could not be sustained and was later abandoned. 
 
3.4. Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP): FNDP was implemented from 1981 to 1985 by a civilian,  
President Shehu Aliyu Shagari, unlike several other plans implemented mostly by the Military regimes. FNDP 
was not really different from previous plans; its budgeted expenditure was N82.2 billion, while the core objectives 
were balanced development, rural infrastructural enhancement and recognition of the local governments as 
development partners (Salawu et al., 2006; Ukah, 2007). Within the implementation period, the government set 
up eleven River Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs), executed rural electrification projects, constructed 
boreholes for portable water supply, constructed dams for agricultural purposes, and several feeder roads as well 
as jetties were developed to enhance links with rural communities (Olayiwola and Adeleye, 2005). It could be 
inferred that MSMEs operating in the agricultural sector “benefited because of marginal improvement in 
agricultural production in areas where the projects were domiciled...the projects were not sustainable” thereafter 
(Akhemonkhan et al., 2012:5).  
 
In addition, the regime introduced the Green Revolution (GR) as an intervention programme for boosting 
agricultural output and discouraged importation of food and cash crops (Raimi et al., 2010). However, FNDP had 
very little impact on entrepreneurship because of disruption of implementation by two successive changes of 
government between 1983 and 1985 (Salawu, 2006). Besides, GR in particular was compromised through 
corruption, illegal appropriation of agricultural farmlands and diversion of funds earmarked for agricultural sector 
enhancement (Raimi et al., 2010; Akhuemonkhan, et al., 2013). 
 
On assumption of office, the Buhari-Idiagbon’s regime, which overthrew the Shehu Aliyu Shagari’s 
administration in 1983, introduced Go-Back-To-Land Programme (GBTLP) to boost self-employment, food 
production and agro-allied enterprises. The goal was not different from the Operation Feed the Nation and Green 
Revolution. The GBTLP “failed because it was built on a wrong premise that poverty can be reduced by 
agricultural expansion” (Akhuemonkhan, et al., 2013:5). 
 
4.0. IPs and EDIs: Era of Perspective Rolling Plans (1986-1999) 
 
The age long five-year development plan inherited from the colonial bureaucrats was jettisoned in 1988 by 
General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida for a perspective rolling plan (Olowookere, 2012). The regime was credited 
with moves to empower MSMEs especially farming communities with the establishment of the Directorate of 
Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), National Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA) 
and National Directorate of Employment (NDE).  DFRRI sought to bring relief to farmers through infrastructural 
development thereby boosting agricultural production, employment and poverty reduction, but the directorate 
failed along the line due to “lack of proper focus and programme accountability”, which combined to rubbish the 
laudable aim of programme (Iwuchukwu and Igbokwe, 2012:14). With respect to NALDA, the intention of 
government was to optimise the land resources for wealth creation, employment, food production, enhanced 
living standards of the rural communities as well as national self-reliance/sufficiency. It failed because of 
opportunistic allocation of land and financial resources to politicians and influential elites rather than the poor 
which the programme focused (Iwuchukwu and Igbokwe, 2012).    
 
Concurrently with ongoing  IBB’s programmes, the wife, late Mariam Babangida set up a pet project tagged 
Better Life for Rural Women for the purpose of motivating and empowering the rural women across the country 
believed to be economically disenfranchised (Arogundade et al., 2011; Akhuemonkhan et al., 2012).   
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Besides, NDE was established during the period to train people to be self-reliant and self-employed. Its objectives 
were articulated under four (4) entrepreneurship programmes, namely: Small-scale Industries and Graduate 
Employment Programme (SSIGEP), National Youth Employment and Vocational Skills Development 
Programme (NYEVSDP), Agricultural sector Employment programme (ASEP) and Special Public Works 
programme (SPWP) (Arogundade et al., 2011; Osemeke, 2012).  The NDE fostered MSMEs, as unemployed 
youth and adults throughout the country accessed entrepreneurial development programme (EDP) and skills 
acquisition training (SAT) under the scheme. Participants took modules on the rudiments of business plan 
preparation, marketing, accessing finance and business sustainability (Osemeke, 2012).  
 
4.1. Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP): At a critical stage during IBB’s regime, SAP was officially 
adopted in 1986 as a neoliberal policy for diversifying, repositioning and restructuring the Nigerian economy 
which was comatose and import-dependent (Ogugua, 1994; Olowookere, 2012). SAP in practice represented a set 
of systematic reforms recommended to the government by the International Monetary Fund as measures for 
embedding economic recovery, reduction of waste in governance, managing external debt burden, boosting local 
production/exports, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), maintaining balanced budget thereby propelling the 
economy on the path of sustainable growth (Ogugua, 1994).  SAP has supporters and antagonists, and each side 
provided economic justifications to back their ideological viewpoints. The National Bureau of Statistics (2012) 
described SAP,  
 
“As an inward-looking policy that emphasises the use of local raw materials ... [by] local producers, particularly 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)...Thus, the Structural Adjustment Policy of 1986 saw the rising profile of 
increased number of MSMEs. As form of encouragement, policies were adopted to use the sector as stepping 
stone for both job creation and industrialization. Industrial development centres, industrial estates, World Bank 
assisted programmes were put in place to encourage the sector. Various SMEs institutions were also established, 
small scale industrial scheme, the National Economic Reconstruction Fund, the small and medium scale loan 
scheme, the people’s bank of Nigeria, and National Directorate of Employment were also established. These 
institutions were however not sustained because they were products of political regimes and went into extinction 
as soon as the regimes were brought to an end. Moreover, there were no enabling laws to formally establish 
MSMEs in Nigeria; as they suffered neglects, constraint to effective development, and funds starvation.” (p.22) 
 
In a sociological critique by Salawu et al., (2006), they argued that pro-government analysts supported SAP on 
the ground that for the Nigerian economy to have a solid foundation, an economic recovery tied to adjustment 
measures was imperative.  Similarly, Okpara et al., (2012) argued that SAP was inevitably embraced to strengthen 
the economy which has suffocated under ‘balance of payments crisis’ caused by the oil glut in the world oil 
market. The policy framework of SAP included suspension of the monopoly commodity marketing boards; 
devaluation of currency to boosts exports, romance with of the flexible exchange rate system, and divestment of 
public enterprises through privatization and commercialisation policies. Other aspects of the framework are 
reduction of waste through review of budget allocation to government agencies, placement of embargo on 
products produced locally by Nigerian entrepreneurs and formulation of National Policy on Agriculture with 
support units (Ogbuneke and Ogbuneke, 2007).  
 
The SAP like other policies had obvious limitations and weaknesses. It is widely believed that SAP provoked 
astronomical increase in prices; drop in the living standards of small income earners, upsurge in crime, illnesses 
as well exalted cases of industrial actions (strikes and lockouts) by workers agitating for increment in 
wages/salaries. The budget cut under SAP adversely affected the education sector, as schools ran out of latest 
text-books and periodicals (Ogugua, 1994). Furthermore, Nwajiuba et al., (2007) noted that SAP imposed 
hardship on Nigerians as well as other Africans whose nations adopted the same adjustment policy. The 
unpopular SAP policy precipitated the phenomenon of migration from Nigeria to developed nations otherwise 
called brain-drain. Besides, the huge investment in projects like NDE, NALDA, BLFRW, and DFRRI did not 
pay-off as these projects yielded poor socio-economic returns (Okpara et al., (2012). Besides, SAP’s expenditure 
tightening measures culminated in fall in worker’s real wages, adverse redistribution of income, rural urban 
migration, and reduction in spending on health, education and important social services. The hopelessness and 
frustration arising from the policy fuelled several social unrests and violent riots and attempted military take-over 
from IBB (The Library of Congress Studies, 1991). 
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5.0. IPs and EDIs: The Contemporary Era (1999-2013) 
 
The contemporary era subsumed IBB’s regime partially, but the development policies and programmes of the 
successor regimes form the bulk of the discourse in the contemporary era. 
 
5.1. General Sanni Abacha’s Vision 2010 
 
The political turbulence in Nigeria triggered another military take-over in 1996; a move that ushered in General 
Sani Abacha as the president. The government replaced IBB’s development plan with the Vision 2010 Blueprint 
on September 18, 1996 (Salawu et al., 2006). The Vision 2010 was formulated to improve the wellbeing and 
quality of life of the citizens within a period of 14 years from 1996 – 2010 (Ogunjimi, 1997). There were also a 
number of developmental programmes designed to promote MSMEs by the president and his wife such as Family 
Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP) and Family Support Programme (FSP) respectively (Raimi et al., 
2010). FEAP was massively funded by government to the tune of N7 billion from which N3.3 billion was 
appropriated to entrepreneurship development and promotion of MSMEs in the areas of animal 
husbandry/poultry, garri processing, soap/detergent production and agric-oriented enterprises (Arogundade et al., 
2011). 
 
The framework of the Vision 2010 includes: deregulation of the economy, release of political prisoners, and need 
for swift transition to civil rule, as well as infrastructural building and development of new capital projects 
(Salawu et al., 2006). Although the regime did not live up to 2010, the impacts of the Vision and associated 
programmes were counterproductive. Rather than impacting on socio-economic development, the programmes led 
to mass retrenchment of public servants both at the federal and state levels; rising poverty and hardship; 
pronounced incidences of ‘failed bank, failed contracts and illegal deals’, political victimization/arrest of 
opposition. In the same vein, the poverty-alleviation and welfare enhancement programmes christened FEAP and 
FSP both failed because they were not people-driven, but championed by politicians for selfish ends (Raimi et al., 
2010). It could be concluded that endemic failure of development polices in Nigeria including Abacha’s Vision 
2010 could be linked to lack of well-articulated plan objectives, frauds & financial corruption, subversion of due 
process in the award of contracts, widespread contract scandals and mismanagement of the oil resources. 
 
5.2. Obasanjo’s Economic Blueprint 
 
Sequel to the return to civilian democratic rule effective from May 29, 1999, the regime of President Olusegun 
Obasanjo came up with new IPs and EDIs designed to reposition the socio-economic and political landscape of 
the country (Arogundade et al., 2011; NBS, 2012). The programmes introduced by Obasanjo’s administration 
within the span of 1999-2007 include:  
 
a) National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS): This was a socio-economic 
blueprint operated at the three levels of government. At the state level, it was SEEDS (State Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy), while at the local level it was acronymed LEEDS (Local Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy). The NEEDS framework was embedded on four key strategies: 
reorienting values, reducing poverty, creating wealth, and generating employment” sequel to Kuru’s Declaration 
of 2001 (National Planning Commission, 2004: IX). Furthermore, the National Planning Commission (2004) 
noted that NEEDS is a development blueprint which schematically ‘integrates economic development efforts’ as 
well as social and environmental developmental challenges at the three levels of government. The blueprint by 
design embeds several programmes, but the goals of the programmes are Wealth creation, Employment 
generation, Poverty reduction and Value reorientation (NEEDS Document, 2004, NPC, 2004). The evaluation of 
these laudable objectives by analysts is often based on the performances of NEEDS programmes. The 
performance is marginal, as it has been replaced by new economic blueprint by successive regimes. 
 
b) National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). The NAPEP was a poverty-alleviation 
programme under NEEDS, which was designed to promote skill acquisition, direct job creation with tricycles, 
seeds capital and youth empowerment (NEEDS Document, 2004; Raimi et al., 2010; Akhuemonkhan, 2012). The 
National Planning Commission (2004) noted that poverty eradication was one of the core issues NEEDS was 
designed to address. According to Arogundade et al., (2011), NAPEP’s operations were structured into schemes 
for easy coordination and evaluation by the National Coordinating Office.  
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These schemes included: Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES), Rural Infrastructures Development Scheme 
(RIDS), Social Welfare Services Scheme (SOWESS) and Natural Resource Development and Conservation 
Scheme (NRDCS). At inception NAPEP was provided a N6 billion subvention for poverty programme design, 
implementation and coordination across Nigeria. Official records indicated that several Nigerians were trained 
and empowered by NAPEP’s under the various schemes enunciated above (Arogundade et al., 2011).  
 
However, NAPEP’s activities were seriously criticised by Nigerians on the ground that the agency aggravated 
rather than alleviate poverty, because it created serious opportunity for the political class and technocrats to divert 
funds meant for empowerment and programmes to personal coffers (Raimi at al.,, 2010; Akhuemonkhan et al., 
2012). Furthermore, the BusinessDay (2010) reported that the supervisory agency of NAPEP was accused of 
diversion of funds, contract scams and fraudulent appropriation of project funds to consultancy firms linked to 
NAPEP officials.  
 
c) Millennium Development Goals (MDGS): In the year 2000, the Millennium Development Goals was 
conceived as an international response to poverty alleviation and associated social ills (United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, 2000).  Raimi et al., (2010) noted Nigeria subsequently endorsed and adopted the eight 
(8) goals as a comprehensive blueprint for sustainable growth and development. The eight goals were introduced 
as part of a wider attempt to encourage the international community to be pragmatic is solving problems of 
developing nations (especially poverty) rather than showing mere empathy without solace. The 8 Millennium 
Development Goals have 18 measurable Targets and Timelines which are to be met by 2015. The goals for the 
purpose of clarity are as succinctly highlighted: 
 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health  
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development (UN MDGs, 2000) 
 
Despite adoption of MDGs, Nigeria and other developing nations manifested weak track records on the 
implementations of MDGs; the eight (8) goals are far from being actualised (Haines and Cassels, 2004; Visser 
(2008). 
 
d) Deregulation and Liberalization Policy (DLP): DLP was a neoliberal policy vigorously pursued in line 
with the thrust of the 2004 NEEDS blueprint. Deregulation is defined as the “substitution of competition for 
monopoly", while other synonyms for deregulation are liberalisation and demonopolisation (Hassan, 2011:11). 
Deregulation within the Nigerian context was embraced to accords greater importance to the organised private 
sector as opposed to exclusive dominance and control of the economy by the government and its agencies (Dappa 
and Daminabo (2011). Deregulation in the Nigerian telecommunication industry has been very successful because 
prior to 1999, Nigeria had only 400,000 connected telephone lines supported by another 25,000 analogue lines to 
cater for the entire population (Adeyinka, et al., 2007). The total teledensity then stood at low ebb of 0.4 lines per 
100 inhabitants in areas where the citizens are fortunate to have telephone signals (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2004). With DPL in place, there was an increment in the customer base from 508,316 
in 1999 to 81,931,223 in 2010 corresponding to 16000% growth rate (Hassan, 2011). The telecommunication 
industry after deregulation generated an initial 5000 direct new jobs and encouraged indirect employment as 
dealers, retailers for GSM handsets and accessories, as well as one-man phone boot operators during the same 
period estimated at 400,000 new jobs (NCC, 2004), which has risen to millions in the recent times (Osemene, 
2012). 
 
Other documented record of performance in the sector was the injection of Foreign Direct and Domestic 
Investment (FDI) valued at US$4 billion, from which the financial sector profited immensely, as providers of 
channels for funds transfer (NCC, 2004). The above positive trends when combined have assisted the growth and 
development of telecommunication-oriented SMEs in Nigeria. This not the case for other sectors. 
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e) Small Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN): This is a supervisory agency on 
micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) established by SMEDAN Act of 2004. It remains a facilitating 
and enabling agency, coordinating all extant public policies on MSMEs in Nigeria (SMEDAN Act, 2004; 
NEEDS, 2004.). The agency carried out a number of activities directed at entrepreneurship and small business 
development in the country. These include creating a “One-Stop Shop” for MSMEs, conducting specialised 
entrepreneurial capacity-building training for members of the National Youth Services Corps (NYSC) under the 
‘Coppers Entrepreneurial Programme (CEP)’.  
 
CEP was designed by SMEDAN to empower graduates undergoing one-year national service to be self-reliant, 
self-employed and self-motivated after the expiration of their one-year volunteerism. Access to ‘technical skill 
development’ like CEP has been extended to non-graduates outside the formal higher education setting in recent 
times (Osemeke, 2012:261). Other beneficial management and advisory services of SMEDAN include: 
development and dissemination of business information; provision of business development services, advancing 
entrepreneurship education & training, guidance on rudiments access to market and finance, and provision of 
advice on enterprise development/enterprise cooperation and ensuring that business operating environment for 
MSMEs is enabling (NBS, 2012).  
 
f) Microfinance Banking in Nigeria (MFBN): Sequel to the abrogation of community banking model in 
Nigeria because of flagrant mismanagement of depositors’ funds, the Central Bank of Nigeria launched a 
microfinance regulatory/supervisory framework in 2005 (NBS, 2012). The framework on MFBs emphasised 
issues of governance and ownership structure, lending methodology, borrower characteristics, appropriate 
management information system (e) internal control mechanisms and procedures for operations (CBN, 2005), 
which had been the missing link in the previous micro-credit models like Peoples Bank of Nigeria, Community 
Bank, Sectoral Allocation of Credits, Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme, Nigerian Agricultural and Co-
operative Bank (NACB) and Rural Banking Programme (Abraham and Balogun, 2012). With a new window 
created for providing financial services to MSMEs, the CBN instructed all operating Community Banks in the 
country to recapitalize and upgrade to Micro Finance Banks (MFBs) effectively from December 2006 as 
stipulated in the micro-finance policy guidelines (CBN, 2005).  
 
The policy guidelines therefore ushered in the era of Micro-Finance Banking in Nigeria; which are simply 
atomistic banks “set up to meet the credit needs of the rural and urban poor, artisans, farmers, petty traders, 
vehicle mechanics etc…” (Raimi et al., 2012:112). MFBs were desirable because commercial banks lend to big 
enterprises with high credit reliability as opposed to MSMEs (Anyanwu, 2010). Furthermore, Babandi (2011) 
noted that MFBs perform three fundamental roles in Nigeria. These include: (a) mainstreaming economic growth, 
(b) provision of access to financial services to vulnerable segment of the society, and (c) acting as intervention 
mechanisms for people with low income. In Nigeria, several surveys had been undertaken to evaluate the 
performances of MFBs. As at 2001, the Central Bank of Nigeria reported a phenomenal growth in the sector with 
a total of 160 registered MFIs, aggregate savings of N99.4 million and micro credits to SMEs of N649.6 million 
(Anyanwu, 2004).  Another CBN survey revealed that the customer base of MFBs in 2001 was 600,000 at least, 
which may hit 1.5 million by 2003 (CBN, 2005; Mohammed and Hasan, 2008). In another evaluation study, 
Abraham and Balogun (2012) identified a total of 665 MFBs with uneven geographical spread across Nigeria. 
Lagos has the highest of 181 MFBs followed by Anambra state with 68 MFBs and Abuja with 48 MFBs. The 
conclusion deducible from the growth trend of MFBs is that the “operators and clients are concentrated in the 
southern zone of the country” than the northern zone with poor MFBs visibility (Abraham and Balogun. 
2012:168). Despite the accolade on MFBs, it faces a number of weaknesses as an entrepreneurship development 
model in Nigeria. According to Mohammed and Hasan (2008), the MFBs in the country provide access to “less 
than 1 million people out of 40 million” prospective customer/MSMEs and the contribution of MFBs to GDP was 
just a pittance of 0.2 percent, hence MFBs cannot alleviate poverty nor accelerate “growth and development” 
(p.2).  
 
g) Small and Medium Industries Equity Investment (SMIEIS): During President Olusegun Obasanjo’s 
regime, the Bankers’ Committee (BC) at its 246th meeting with CBN reflected on the plight of SMEs in Nigeria 
and consequently took a pragmatic decision to assist the sector with 10 per cent of their profit after tax (PAT) 
annually under a private-sector scheme called Small and Medium Enterprises Equity Investment Scheme 
(Anyanwu, 2004; NBS 2012).  
h)  
© Center for Promoting Ideas, USA                                                                                                www.ijhssnet.com 
303 
 
The scheme although encouraged by the Federal Government for promoting the growth of SMEs in the country, 
but suffers major weaknesses associated with definition of SMEs and the terms & conditions to be fulfilled by 
SMEs/MSMEs; hence the patronage/utilization rate of SMEEIS accumulated fund was only 3 percent 
(Inegbenebor, 2006). Poor access to the fund prompted the BC to allow 10 per cent of SMEEIS’s funds to be 
disbursed as support loans to “micro-enterprises through registered microfinance institutions” in Nigeria 
(Anyanwu, 2004:10). Five-year overview of SMEEIS’s performance from December 1999 to December 2004, 
revealed that SMEEIS had accumulated N42 billion (Anyanwu, 2004).  Worse still, an overview of SMEEIS’s 
performance for a period of ten years (December 1999 to December 2009) put SMEEIS’s accumulated fund at 
N42 billion (NBS, 2012).  
 
5.3. Yar’adua Development Blueprint 
 
The regime of President Umaru Musa Yar’adua implemented two key economic policies discussed hereunder. 
 
a) The 7- Point Agenda (2007-2010): This represented a socio-economic blueprint of development of late 
President Umaru Musa Yar’adua, which became effective on 29th May 2007. The policy thrust of the 7-point 
Agenda was infrastructural building, empowerment of the citizens as well as sustainable economic development 
(Dung-Gwom, 2010). It was also developed as an intervention measure for accelerating economic growth and 
development in Nigeria.  The key elements of the blueprint in clear terms were: (i) Power and Energy, (ii) Food 
Security, (iii) Wealth Creation, (iv) Transport Sector, (v) Land Reforms, (vi) Security and (vii) Education (Dung-
Gwom, 2010; Dode, 2010).  It could be argued that the 7-Point Agenda was a failure like other development 
programmes when its performance is correlated with “available indices” of economic development especially 
unemployment, corruption, growth of SMEs. The failure also occurred because the administration “lacks the 
political and administrative will to implement the seven–point agenda with the zeal it deserves” and its scope was 
bogus and should have been reduced to at most two agenda (Dode, 2010:7-8).  
 
b) Vision 20:2020 Economic Blueprints: In 2009, the same government came up with the Vision 20:2020 
(Dung-Gwom, 2010), as a long-term economic blueprint designed for properly launching the Nigerian economy 
towards a path of sustained and rapid socio-economic development (Nigeria Vision 20:2020, 2009). The blueprint 
was intended to run for a period of eleven years (11) beginning from 2009 and terminating in 2020. According to 
Akhuemonkhan and Raimi (2012), the Vision 20:2020 blueprint was formulated to enhance the wellbeing of 
Nigerians thereby facilitating emergence of the country as one of the Top 20 emerging economies. The blueprint 
envisages “a minimum GDP of $900 billion and a per capita income of no less than $4000 per annum” if the 
economy is well managed in line with the thrust of the blueprint (Nigeria Vision 20:2020 Blueprint, 2009:9). Both 
the 7-point Agenda and NV20:2020 had very low performance scorecard because attempted to replicate the 
NEEDS Document (Dung-Gwom, 2010). Despite the financial and material resources expended on the Vision 
20:2020 document, the power sector in Nigeria remains epileptic; the economy could not create additional 
employment with unemployment hovering around 23.9%; poverty rate rose to 69% and the debt profile surged 
(CBN 2010; NBS, 2010). 
 
5.3. Economic Transformation Agenda  
 
President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan introduced Economic Transformation Agenda (ETA) and continued the 
Vision 20:2020. The ETA is planned to run from 2011 to 2015. It is designed to correct the flaws in the country’s 
drive for sustainable growth and development, for the overall enhancement of the welfare of Nigerian citizens. 
Transformation Agenda draws its inspiration from the Vision 20:2020 (Usigbe, 2011).  The ETA is still ongoing. 
The following are some programmes inherited and created to drive the Transformation agenda. 
 
a) N200 Billion Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Guarantee Scheme (SMECGS): The SMECGS in 
Nigeria represents a N200 billion intervention guarantee scheme created by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as 
part government developmental agenda (CBN, 2010, NBS, 2012). The scheme provide guarantee support to 
SMEs to the tune of N100 million once the terms and conditions of lending stated by participating banks and 
government (as guarantor) are met by prospective SMEs (CBN, 2010). It is instructive to note that a general 
overview of the performance of SMECGS revealed that, it suffered the same fate as the Small and Medium 
Industries Equity Investment (SMIEIS) established in 1999. The first problem is linked to the definitional 
construct of SMEs provided by CBN; the definition precludes so many small businesses that require SMECGS 
intervention support.  
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The second problem is linked to apathy from SMEs and participating banks to access the fund fearing 
environmental risk factors in Nigeria. Kolawole (2010) affirmed that the CBN lamented that five months after the 
commencement of SMECGS, the banks showed apathy towards accessing the funds because no formal 
application was made. Another problem relates to formalities of business registration, filling of several 
applications for CGS, evidence of collateral and the clause of compulsory membership of organised association 
(CBN, 2010).  
 
b) The Film Fund (FF): The absence of meaningful support for entrepreneurs and SMEs in the Nigerian 
film industry underscored Federal Government’s open declaration at Zuma Film Festival in 2012, to set up a $200 
million film fund under the custody of the Bank of Industry to support entrepreneurs in the film industry.  
 
 
Beneficiaries would include creative Nigerian artistes, producers and SMEs, who needed to be supported with 
funds for the production of their creative films and artistic products. The new funding mechanism, according the 
government became expedient to support entrepreneurs in the SMEs categorisation (Onogu, 2012) 
 
c) The N100 billion Cotton, Textile and Garment (CTG) Fund: Similar to the Film Fund discussed 
above, the government through its banker – Central Bank of Nigeria created an intervention fund to bail-out 
MSMEs in ‘the cotton, textile and garment value chain’ from infrastructural and operational challenges The CTG 
fund is part of government’s economic recovery strategy for the actualisation of the ongoing transformation 
agenda of the present administration (NBS, 2012)..  
 
d) Power and Aviation Intervention Fund (PAIF): Another intervention fund established to fortify the 
aviation sector is the PAIF. Considering the vibrancy of the sector, the sum of N300 billion was earmarked for 
Power and Aviation sectors under the PAIF (Kolawole, 2010). It is the believed of policymakers that when the 
two sectors are well positioned, they would serve as springboards and catalysts for the growth of real sector of the 
economy, a boost to private sector investment and enhancement of the wellbeing the citizens (CBN, 2012). 
 
e) The N2 billion NERFUND Facility for MSMEs: In furtherance of commitment to elevate the status of 
MSMEs in Nigeria, the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND), an agency of government 
provided N2 billion support fund for disbursement as soft loans to MSMEs through SMEDAN. The policy 
objective of the fund is to “stimulate the MSMEs and realign them towards the economic aspirations of the 
Government.” Consequently, the beneficiaries are screened by SMEDAN and recommended to NERFUND based 
on the viability of their business ideas and business plan (NBS, 2012:27).  
 
f) Counterpart Funding Scheme (CFS): Among the funding schemes designed by the past and present 
governments is the CFS. It was created by the Bank of Industry (BOI) as funding option for the MSME sector in 
Nigeria. The CFS is a collaborative arrangement between BOI and willing state governments. A participating 
state provides “one billion Naira to the bank for on-lending to micro, small and medium enterprises in such state”, 
while BOI complements “with additional one billion Naira...The scheme has gone a long way in solving the 
challenge of adequate finance confronting many MSMES in the various states” (NBS, 2012:28). 
 
g) Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (You Win) Programme: YouWiN represents a boost for 
youth entrepreneurship and MSMEs in Nigeria. It started in 2011 as an annual competition model designed to 
determine after series of simulation exercises, the most innovative business plan of emerging entrepreneurs 
worthy to be financed (YouWiN, 2013). The Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YouWiN!) is the 
initiative of three agencies of government, namely: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Communication Technology 
and Ministry of Youth Development, with private sector funders and SMEDAN as the monitors (NBS, 2012). The 
purpose of You WiN entrepreneurial programme is to fast tract job creations among creative youth in the country 
through rigorous demonstration of enterprise skills, leadership and innovativeness (NBS, 2012). 
 
h) The N5 billion Dangote Fund for MSMEs: On May 12, 2013, the Federal government created the N5 
billion Dangote Fund for MSMEs under a public-private partnership (PPP) scheme. The fund is under the 
guardianship of the Bank of Industry (BOI) and could be accessed by qualified MSMEs to fortify and expand 
their enterprises (NBS, 2012). The fund attracts 5 per cent interest and accessible to four types of beneficiaries, 
namely: Members of Cooperative Associations, Stand alone or Individual borrowers, Small enterprises and 
Medium Enterprises (BOI, 2012).  
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i) Subsidy Reinvestment & Empowerment Programme (Sure Programme (SURE-P): This is a 
palliative programme inaugurated on the 13th February 2012 as a response to cushion the impact of removal of 
fuel subsidy on Premium Motor Spirit (PMS). It is part of the Economic transformation agenda, with a life span of 
three years (2012 – 2015). The savings from subsidy removal was dedicated as SURE-P fund and being utilised 
for socio-economic projects and programmes considered beneficial to the citizens (SURE-P, 2013). Like other 
EDIs, the SURE-P intervention is criticized as being subverted. The weakness of SURE-P is linked to the manner 
in which the scheme was hastily conceptualized and designed within 6 months, by the Finance Minister and the 
nation’s Economic Team. The goals were equally viewed as unattainable as the policy document left out vital 
omissions and some figures were at variance due to lack thoroughness in swift attempts to provide academic 
justification for subsidy removal (Sobowale, 2013). At present it is being speculated that N500 billion SURE-P’s 
fund is missing (Adisa, 2013). 
 
 
6.0.   Development Plans and Impacts on Macro-Economic Indices 
 
A look at all the development plans, IPs and EDIs, it could be observed that their performances have not been 
very impressive, when viewed against the nation’s macro-economic indices like unemployment rate, poverty rate 
and external debt in Table 1 below. In spite of the various development efforts, the unemployment rate, poverty 
rates and external debt for 1980 stood at 6.4%, 27.2% and N1,866.8 billion respectively. In 1999, the situation 
worsened because external debt obligation, unemployment and poverty rates rose astronomically to 
N2,577,374.40, 13.7% and 41.6% respectively. The situation deteriorated in 2000, 2005, 2011 for the three 
macro-economic indices. For external debt, the situation worsened because Nigeria like other TWNs in sub-
Saharan Africa opted for a development paradigm that hinged heavily on foreign financing/loans from developed 
countries and international monetary institutions (Ajayi and Oke, 2012).  
 
Table 1: Macro-Economic Data on Insecurity, Poverty and Development 
 
Year Unemployment Rate Poverty Rate External Debt (N’ million) 
1970 4.8 NA 175.0 
1980 6.4 27.2 1,866.8 
1990 3.38 38.0 298,614.40 
1995 1.90 59.3 716,865.60 
1996 3.80 64.6 617,320.00 
1997 2.60 54.1 595,931.90 
1998 3.90 41.6 633,017.00 
1999 13.7 41.6 2,577,374.40 
2000 13.1 65.6 3,097,383.90 
2001 13.6 65.6 3,176,291.00 
2002 12.6 65.6 3,932,884.80 
2003 14.8 65.5 4,478,329.30 
2004 13.4 54.4 4,890,269.60 
2005 11.9 54.4 2,695,072.20 
2006 12.3 54.4 451,461.70 
2007 12.7 70.0 431,079.85 
2008 14.9 51.6 493,180.22 
2009 19.7 55 590,441.08 
2010 21.1 69 689,845.30 
2011 23.9 72 NA 
         
Sources: Federal Office of Statistics (1990 – 2004), National Bureau of Statistics (2010), Central Bank of 
Nigeria (1990, 2000-2010) and CIA Factbook (2011) 
 
On the strength of the content analysis made in this critique and supported by the macro-economic data above, it 
could be objectively concluded that Nigeria’s industrial policies and entrepreneurship interventions has not 
impacted on technological progress (TP), wealth creation (WC) and employment generation (EG) in the economy. 
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6.1. Conclusion, Implication and Recommendations 
The paper sets out to carry out a Spatio-Temporal Audit of Nigeria’s IPs and EDIs from 1946 to 2013. After the 
audit of policy documents, journal articles on the subject, it was systematically established that rather than fast-
tracking technological progress, wealth creation and employment generation, Nigeria’s DPs, IPs and EDIs put 
Nigeria into “huge economic deficits” (Olowookere, 2012:33-34). The nation suffers protracted increases in 
unemployment and poverty from 1970 to 2011. In other words, Nigeria’s development policies targeted at 
industrial and entrepreneurship development have not produced the desirable and measurable performance results, 
a phenomenon common to developing nations. The common factors responsible for this ugly scenario are political 
corruption and fraudulent implementation of all IPs and EDIs (Ukah, 2007; Raimi et al., 2010). Another factor is 
the governance gap caused by failure of market forces in developing nations (Dartey-Baah and Amponsah-
Tawiah, 2011) as well as inefficient public authority (Mitlin et al. 2007).  
 
For subsequent DPs, IPs and EDIs to be more impactful on economic, social and environmental dimensions of the 
society, thereby enhancing technological progress, wealth creation and employment generation, the under-listed 
recommendations are proposed for implementation. 
 
a) It is suggested that Nigeria’s ongoing and subsequent development plans and associated IPs and EDIs 
should be carefully conceived and formulated in line with the needs and expectations of the citizens 
before implementation. Often times, development plans as seen in the critique are imposed on the citizens 
without embedding citizens’ needs and expectations.  
 
b) National development plans and economic blueprints have become conduit for cornering national 
resources in Nigeria as enunciated in the critique. Therefore, the policymakers must ensure that national 
interests and citizen’s welfare are placed above personal and sectional interests when implementing 
development plan documents. 
 
c) It is also imperative that the modalities for policy or plan implementation should be transparent, prudent 
and accountable. Diversion of funds, abuse of offices, mismanagement of resources, waste and fragrant 
violation of due process marred the implementation of several economic policies and welfare-oriented 
programmes in Nigeria. 
 
d) There is need for the nation’s development planners to focus systematically the critical sectors of 
economy not peripheral white-elephant projects and programmes judging by the outcomes of OFN, GR, 
Back-to-Land programmes, NAPEP, NEEDS, NDE, 7-Point Agenda, SURE-P et cetera. 
 
e) Considering the fact that governance is a continuum, it is strongly recommended that successive 
governments should retain, consolidate and expand on the development plan and programmes of their 
predecessors. The culture of start-afresh does not allow for sustainable development and measurable 
economic growth. 
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